THE ORIGIN AND FIRST TEST OF PUBLIC CALLINGS*
Frequently in defining rules of law we must delve deeply
into the past to find the reason for the rule of conduct or liability. The reason in many cases has ceased to exist, yet the rule
still lives; the dead fabric interwoven with the newer fine-spun
creations of this age. A field of law that is enclosing within itself vast portions of old law, at an unusually rapid rate today,
is that which concerns businesses affected with a public interest.
The exact direction which this development shall take, accelerated
by the immense pressure brought by our industrial structures of
this day, is open to wide and interesting speculation. Whether
it will eventually include all businesses within its grip, like a giant
octopus pressing its unwelcome hold, silently and unconsciously
upon one class of business at a time, or whether it shall soon be
caught and held within bounds by definite rules soundly worked
out, is worth considering. We have the view presented of a
bureaucratic government regulating every phase of human activity. Whether our government is progressing or retrogressing at
this time, we should know. Are we reverting to the paternalism
of the thirteenth century, or the laissez faire policy and extreme
individualism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? Or
is it a middle course we are steering? Practical reasons may be
found for an investigation of the original duties and their limitations upon business.

THE DUTY TO USE CARE.
Early cases indicate that certain duties were imposed upon
those in a trade, or common calling, to care for property, while
like duties were not imposed upon others on the same state of
facts. James Barr Ames points out: 1
"The original notion of a tort to one's person or property was an injury caused by an act of a stranger. . . . If
one saw fit to authorize another to come into contact with
*The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor Hugh E.
Willis, of Indiana University, for reading the manuscript and offering many
helpful suggestions.
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his person or property, and damage ensued, there was, without more, no tort. The person injured took the risk of all
injurious consequences, unless the other expressly assumed
the risk himself, or unless the peculiar nature of one's calling, as in the case of the smith, imposed a customary duty
to act with reasonable skill. This conception is well shown
by thd
remarks of the judges in a case against a horse doc2
tor.

"Newton, C. J.: 'Perhaps he applied his medicine de son
bon grg, and afterwards your horse died; now, since he did

it de son bon grg you shall not have an action. . .

Paston,

J.: 'You have not shown that he is a common surgeon to
cure such horses, and so, although he killed your horse by
his medicines, you shall have no action against him without
an assumpsit.' "
This general duty to use care is noted by Fitzherbert in 1514,
who said:
"If a smith prick my horse with a nail, I shall have
my action on the case against him without any warranty by
the smith to do it well; for it is the duty of every artificer
to exercise his art rightly and truly as he ought." 3
One of the earliest cases in the books was against an innkeeper. It was alleged that the plaintiff's goods were stolen
while in the custody of the innkeeper and he was chargeable by
the custom of the realm. No fault was alleged and it was demurred to.
Knevet, J., said it was like the case of a suit against the
4
hundred by one robbed within it.

In the Doctor and the Student (I518), it is said:
"It is commonly holden in the laws of England if a
common carrier go by the ways that be dangerous for robbing, or drive by night or in other inconvenient time and
be robbed; or if he overcharge a horse whereby he falleth
into the water, or otherwise so that the stuff is hurt or impaired; that he shall stand charged for his misdemeanor;
and if he would percase refusi to carry it unless promise
were made unto him that he shall not be charged for no
misdemeanor that should be in him, the promise were void;
'Y. B. ig H. vi, f. 49, p1. 5 (1440).
'NAT. BREV. 94d.
'Y. B. 42 ED. III, f. ii, pl. 13 (1368).
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for it were against reason and against good manners, and
so in all other cases, like. And all these diversities be granted
by secondary conclusions derived upon the law of reason,
without any statute made in that behalf. And peradventure
laws, and conclusions therein be the more plain, and the more
open. For if any statute were made therein I think verily
more doubts and questions would arise upon the statute than
doth now when they be only argued and judged after the
common law." I
The records from 1367 to 1518 show a well recognized liability of those engaged in a trade, because of the custom of the
realm or public policy. In no case is mention made of an undertaking or assumpsit. This view is taken by Mr. Justice Holmes:
"If damage had been done or occasioned by the act
or
omission of the defendant in the pursuits of some of the
more common callings, such as that of the farrier, it seems
that the action would be maintained, without laying an
assumpsit, on the allegation that he was a 'common' farrier.
The latter principle was also wholly independent of bailment. It expressed the general obligation of those exercising a public or 'common' business to practise their art on
demand, and show skill in it." 1
This ruie of liability is brought out still more strongly when
we examine the earlier cases of assumpsit. They were all, without exception, against persons exercising a trade or calling.7 Did
this duty to use care, imposed upon common callings, owe its
origin to the action of assumpsit, or did the law recognize this
liability previously? The writer believes the origin of this duty
'Dialogue 2, c. 38.
'THE CommoN LAW 184
"The earliest cases in which an assumpsit was laid in the declaration were
cases against the ferryman, who undertook to carry the plaintiff's horse over the
river, but overloaded the boat, whereby the horse was drowned (Y. B. 22 Ass.
94, pl. 41) ; against a surgeon who undertook to cure the plaintiff or his animals
but who administered contrary medicine or otherwise unskillfully treated their
patients (Y. B. 43 Ed. in, f. 6, pl. ii (z369) ; ii R. 2 Fitz. Ab., Action on the
case, 37; Y. B. 3 H. vi, f. 36, pl. 33 (424)) against a smith for laming a horse
while shoeing it (Y.B. 46 Ed. in, f. ig, pl. ig (372) ; Y. B. 12 Ed. iv, f. 13,
pI. 9 (1472) against a barber who undertook to shave the' beard of the plaintiff
with a clean and wholesome razor, but who performed the work negligently and
unskillfully to the great injury of the plaintiff's face (4 H. vii Rast. Ent. 2,
b. I (1498)) ; against a carpenter who undertook to build well and faithfully but
who built unskillfully (Y. B. ii H. iv, f. 33, pl. 6o (I4O9))." AMES, op. cit. Supra
note i at 260.
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is not in the action of assumpsit, but rather the reverse; assumpsit, at least to a great extent, owes its origin to the duty of those
engaged in common callings to use care. It seems peculiar that
assumpsit should apply in the first instances only to active misconduct by those in common callings, and not to every one who
should be guilty of such misconduct. The only personal actions
available prior to the action on the case (1285) were: covenant,
trespass, account, detinue, replevin, debt, and deceit. Under
none of these, according to the early theory of liability, could a
duty be imposed upon common callings which differed from that
imposed upon every one regardless of calling. When there is no
remedial law for enforcement of such duties we could hardly say
that such rights or duties existed. Hence the origin of the duty
to use care must have been between the date of the action on the
case and the time when the action of assumpsit was developed.
There is some ground for the belief that the action of deceit (before the action on the case affected it) gave some sort of
a remedy. This action as first used was of a criminal nature."
The damages being paid part to the king, and part to the wronged
person. It could be used only when a person had been deceived
in a civil action by the act of another person. There is no record of any other instance of its use. 9
When the action on the case was developed, by analogy, we
have an action on the case in the nature of deceit, an action in
consimili casu with the old action of deceit. This newer action
of deceit was vastly greater in scope than the old action. Ames
says:

10

"A vendor was not answerable to the vendee for any
defect of title or quality in the chattels sold unless he had
either given an express warranty, or was under a public
duty, from the nature of his calling, to sell articles of a
certain quality. A taverner, or vintner was bound as such
$FITZ. NAT. BRav. 95e et seq.; REG. BIEV.ORIG. 112 et seq.
' "This form of action, like the others, is ancient, being older, by more than
a century, than special assumpsit. The words super se assumpsit were not used,
it is true, in a count upon a warranty; but the notion of undertaking was equally
well conveyed by warrantizandovendidit." AMES, op. Cit. supra note I at 266.

"0Ibid. at 268.
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to sell wholesome food and drink.'- Their position was
analogous to that of the smith, common carrier, and innkeeper."
This seens to indicate that there was a certain recognized
duty placed uppn those in a comnqon cp.ljng prior to the action
of assumpsit. Persons who suffered a stranger or one not engaged in a calling to come in contact with his person or property
had no remedy for any resulting injury, for he was not deceived
or induced by any representation of skill to part with his goods,
etc. The origin of the d ty to serve should not be confused with
that tq 1se care, which, it is believed, is entirely different.
Professor 314Prdick seepis to take the view that the early test
applied t a 'plcblc' Fpaling was a "holding out" to serve, which
had its origin in the aptiop of assumpsit. He says:' 2
"Originally when 4n individual voluntarily entered
into deali*gs with another and damages ensued, through the
latter's fatt, there was, in the conception pf the early lawyers, no tort-it wjs only when qp asspimpsit and a breach
thereof were pleaded, that an action on the case could at first
be maintained under such circumstances. It would seem that
the origin and basis of the liability of the person engaged
ill
a common calling for failure to serve, or for lack of care
in the performance of the service, is to be found in the early
developed branch of the action on the case. It was because
a person held himself out to serve the public generally, making that his business, and in doing so assumed to serve all
members of the public who should apply, and to serve them
with care, that he was liable in an action on the case for
refusal to serve or for lack of care in the performance of
the service, by which refusal or lack of care he had committed a breach of his assumpsit. .

.

. The fact that one

was a common carrier, common innkeeper, common farrier,
or common tailor was of itself a general assumpsit to serve
carefully in carrying, shoeing, tailoring or giving shelter, and
the allegation in such actions that the person charged was
a common carrier or common innkeeper, etc., involved of
necessity in the word 'common' the implied allegation of an
assumpsit to serve properly."
'1Y. B. 9 H. vi, f. 53, pl. 37 (i43o); Keilw. 9I, pl. i6 (1so6); Roswell v.
Vaughan, Cro. Jac. i96 (16o7); Burnby v. Bollet, i6 M . &1. 644, 654 (1847).
2I1
COL.L. REv. 514 (1gii).
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As noted, the statement of Professor Burdick starts with
the major premise that an assumpsit was necessary; ordinarily
it was expressed, but might be implied from the word "common."
If we ask why an assumpsit was a necessary allegation, we will
arrive at the very foundation of liability in such cases. The
answer is that the liability, at the time, was based upon the deceit which the person engaged in the common calling practiced
upon the plaintiff, when he induced the plaintiff to allow him
to come into contact with the plaintiff's goods or person, by the
representation that he was skilled in his trade.' 3 If the plaintiff
permitted any other person, not in a common calling, to do the
act, and an injury resulted, he had no action. This doctrine
later was extended to cases when one was not engaged in a common calling but made an express promise to use care. 1 4 The development seems to me to be exactly reversed to that expressed
by Professor Burdick. There can be no doubt that the courts a
few hundred years later became confused as to the meaning or
purpose of the allegation of assumpsit in the action, as I shall
attempt to show later.'3 They seemed to believe that the assuming (promise) or holding out, was the basis of the action when,
in reality, it was merely a means of showing the deceit practised
upon the plaintiff.' 6
Special assumpsit, it seems, had its origin in two sources.
The first was the action of deceit on the case.'" The gist of the
action as mentioned above was the deceit in the breaking of the
promise on the faith of which plaintiff had been injured. It was
The holding out was merely one method of showing deceit and might be
shown in other ways. Y. B. 46 Ed. iii, f. 19, pl. I9 (1372).
14

"So far as we can see, the common law refused to recognize negligence,

i. e. omission of a positive duty, as the grounds of legal liability; except where

the defendant had expressly taken upon himself such duty, or where (as in the
case of a surgeon, common carrier, innkeeper, etc.) his profession or calling was
deemed to be a 'holding out' to that effect." Jenks, Negligence and Deceit in
the Law of Torts, 26 LAW Q. REv. 159, 162 (1gio).
"See 3 HoLDswoRTn, HIST. OF ENG. LAW (3d Ed. 1923) 432. "It is true
that in some of these cases (common callings) there would be no liability to
compensate for damages caused if there had not been an undertaking; but it
was not the breach of the undertaking which was the ground of the action.
The ground of the action was the damage caused by the wrongful act (i. e.
deceit).

.

.

. It did not make the undertaking the grounds of the action."

"Fitz. Ab., Monst. De Faits, pl. 16o (383)
(1430).
"

AiMEs, op. cit. supra note I at 273.

; Y. B. 9 H. vi, f. 53, pl. 37
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immaterial whether the promisee or a third person was to get
the benefit of the promise.18
The second source Was a development from certain other
actionis on the case in Which an undertaking, (that is, an actual
stdtihg of the task) was alleged. The first cases in assumpsit
were cases of conition callings, as Ames points out. 19 Yet this
allegation of an undertaking in the first instances was not an indispensable part of the declaration, but merely incidental to showing a wk-ong done (such as deceit) 2O° Before long the courts
begani to ctioceive of the action as really being based upon the
udeft ing, sirice this allegation was found in all of the first
cases.2i 'the taklig of iidtiey beforehand by the promisor" 22
was suficlht utfi&ttakiHg to gr-und an action. On this theory
a breach ot paroi promhise was just as actionable as a breach of
an undertaking in a commofi tiling. The wrong committed in
both instances were bf the same character. There was deceit in
both cases. Professor Saniond says:23
"Trespass was-applicable only to cases of damages to a
person or property of the plaintiff. But deceit included all
cases in which plaintiff had suffered injury by acting in reliance otf defendant's promise."
"Defendant held for deceit, when plaintiff on strength of his promise sold
goods
1 to a third person. Y. B. 13, H. viii, f. II, pl. 3 (1521).
Supra note 6.
Y. B. 46 Ed. II, f. ig, pl. 19 (1372).
Street says, "From the time when the action on the case first came into
prominence, the pleader often found it necessary or proper to state, among other
things, that the wrong complained of was done by the defendant while engaged
in performing and undertaking an agreement. But this statement merely served
to show that the injury complained of was done under such circumstances as
excused the plaintiff from suing in trespass and from alleging that the wrong
was done with force and arms. Negligent injury to property which had lawfully come into the defendant's care was the gist of the action, and the breach
of the promise was merely incidental and collateral to the true ground of liability. In such cases the plaintiff generally alleged that the defendant undertook
(enprise) (Y.B. ii H. IV,f. 33, pl. 6o (1409)) or assumed (assume sur my)
(Y. B. ig H. vi, f. 49, pl. 5 (i44o)) to do a particular act. Liability was not
derived from the promise, and where the fact that the defendant did enter upon
the enterprise sufficiently appedred on the facts of the case, no allegation of
assumpsit, was as a matter of law, necessary (Y. B. 46 Ed. in, f. ig, pl. i9
(1372) ). As was natural, it came to pass in time that in cases where an
assumpsit or undertaking on the part of the defendant was alleged, the cause of
action was occasionally viewed as being in some way based on the promise.
(Y. B. 48 Ed. In, f. 6, pl. II (0374) )." 3 STREET'S FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL
LrBILIrY (I9o6) T73.
Fitz. NAT. BREv. g4a; Keilw. 77, pl. 25 (i5o5).
ESSAY IN JURISPRUDENCE 208.
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From what has been said by writers upon the subject, the
duty to use care seems to have had its origin in tort rather than
contract. It applied to all businesses alike, and still does today; no
distinction being made between "public" and "private" callings,
as to the duty to use care. Hence the duty to use care has no
significance in the determination of those callings upon which are
placed peculiar duties and those upon which no unusual duties
are placed. The duty to serve all who apply is the real criterion,
the writer believes, by which such businesses are to be determined.
II.
THE DUTY TO SERVE.

Thus far it has been shown that those engaged in a calling
were liable at common law for their negligent acts while engaged
in their trade. But if an individual chose to employ a stranger
not professing a trade to do the act, he had no remedy if an
injury occurred. This duty seems to have been applied to all
callings alike. Fitzherbert said as late as I514,24 "It is the duty
of every artificer to exercise.his art rightly and truly as he ought."
Today, also, the duty to use care is placed alike upon all businesses
or callings. No distinction seems, in the early days, to have
been made between "public" and "private" callings, so far as the
duty to use care was concerned. The distinction made was between those engaged in a trade or "common" occupation, and
those unskilled in any trade. If one chose to allow one of the
latter class to come into contact with his person or goods, he
assumed the risk of injury, without any remedy for damages.
This fact, it is believed, is the occasion for the use of the word
"common" in connection with the occupation of the defendant.
The writer thinks there is no basis for any classification of business into public or private. There is neither logic nor practicability in such an arrangement, nor is there any reason historically
for such a division. The word ",common" meant simply "business." 25 That is, one engaged in work as a trade in which he
'FITZ.

NAT. BREv. 94d.

In 1367 a perfect illustration is given of the use of the word "common"
in the order for porters and creelmen, "who exercise that craft conmnzonly."
Beverly Town Doc. 21.
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made his living. It seems then, the words "common carrier"
meant one in the business of carrying as a trade, as distinguished
from one who did it as a casual act or by special agreement. 2 6
The word is used in this sense and not in the present sense of
"pnblic' ir aljj t4.e early ipstances, as: common merchant, commoi marchal, common schoolmaster, common surgeon.2 7 Sir
William Jones,28 Blackstone, 29 Justice Story,3 0 and Chancellor
"As late as 17Io it was said in Gisbourn v. Hurst, . Salk. 249, that "goods
delivered to any person exercising a public trade or employment, to be carried,
wrought or managed in the way of trade or employ, are for the time under legal
proteptior, and privilege from 4istress for rent."
21Y. ,, 7 H. IV, f. 44, pl. TT (1405); Y. B. i9 H. Vi, f. 49, P1. 5 (440);
Y.. 9 d. IV.f. 32, p, 4'.(1469) ; Y. B. 1 gH. vi, f. 49. pl. 5 (i44o).
Sir William Josses says, '%i is indisputably clear, that an action lies in
bot cases for reparqtiop or darpnges whenever the work was undertaken for a
reward either actually paid or e,-prcssly stipulated, or in the case of the common
trader, strongly implied, of which Blackstone gives the following instance: 'If
a builder promises, undertakes or gsstMes to Caius that he will build and cover
his house within 4 time limite4, ard fails to do it, Caius has an action on the
case against the builder for this breach of his express promise, and shall recover
a pecuniary satisfction for the injury sustained by such deay.' (3 B. Co,.
*I57.) The learned author mpeaned, I presume, a comI"on builder, or supposed
a consideration to be given." BAILMENTS 100. (The italics are the writer's.)
" Blackstone says, "The last class of contracts, implied by reason and constructiop of law, arise upon this supposition, that every one who undertakes any
office, employmept, trust, or duty, contracts with those who employ or intrust
him to perform it with integrity, diligence and skill. ....
There is also in
law always an implied contract with a common innkeeper to secure his guest's
goods in his inn; with a common carrier, or bargemaster, to be answerable for
the goods he carries, with a common farrier, that he shoes a horse well, without
laming him ; with a common tailor, or other workman, that he perform his
business in a workmanlike manner; in which if they fail, an action on the case
lies to recover damages for such breach of their original undertaking (ii Rep.
54, 1 Saund. 312a). But if I employ a person to transact any of these concerns, whose common profession and business it is not, the law implies no such
general undertaking; but in order to charge him with damages, a special agreement is required. Also, if an innkeeper or other victualler, hangs out a sign
and opens his house for travelers, it is an implied engagement to entertain all
persons who travel that way; and upon his universal assumpsit and action upon
the case will lie against him for damages if he without good reason refuses to
admit a traveler. (I Vent. 333.)" 3 BL. Com. *165.
' 0 Justice Story says, "Who are deemed common carriers? It is not (as we
have seen) every person who undertakes to carry goods for hire, that is deemed
a common carrier. A private person may contract with another for the carriage of his goods and incur no responsibility beyond that of any ordinary bailee
for hire, that is to say, the responsibility of ordinary diligence. (Bac. Abr.,
Carriers, A; Robinson v. Dunmore, 2 Bos. & Pl. 417 (i8o) ; Hodgson v.
Fullarton, 4 Taunt. 787 (1813)). To bring a person within the description of a
common carrier he must exercise it as a public employment; he must undertake
to carry goods for persons generally; and he must hold himself out as ready to
engage in the transportation of goods for hire as a business, not as a casual
occupation, pro hac vice (Gisbourne v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249 (7O) ; Sutterlee v.
Groat, i Wend. 273 (N. Y. 1828); I Bell Com. (sth ed.) 467). A common
carrier has, therefore, been defined to be one who undertakes for hire or reward

42o
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Kent Sl explain the law on the subject by this theory of the meaning of the word "common." 32
A fundamental difficulty lies in the conception that business
is of two classes, public and private, and that the latter is subject
to no duties to individuals without agreement, or control by the
state. Carrying on a business is not a casual act, but a habitual
and common practice of rendering service for compensation.
"Common" as used in "common carrier" is generally assumed to
mean "public," when in reality the original use of the adjective
was merely to distinguish those who carried as a trade and those
who carried as occasional acts. Businesses, it is true, had certain peculiar duties placed upon them, such as the duty to serve
all who applied; but this was because of the peculiar economic
conditions of the time, it is believed. The reason for these duties
being placed upon a business, was not because it was "public"
but because it was more important to the public at the particular
33
time.
The legal content of the phrase "public calling" may now
be too firmly woven into the legal fabric to hope for much change,
but its original significance should not be lost sight of. The
classification seems not to have been based upon any inherent
characteristic of the business itself, but the division was made
upon a factor outside the business which varied as centuries went
by. All trades in time of distress or economic paralysis were
affected with a very high degree of public interest. The duty to
to transport the goods of such as chose to employ him from place to place.
(Dwight v. Brewster, i Pick. 50, 53 (Mass. 1822) ; Gisbourne v. Hurst, I Salk.
249, 250 (71o).)"
BAILMENTS (9th ed. 1878) 464, §489.
" Chancellor Kent says, "Common carriers undertake, generally, and not as
a casual occupation and for all people indifferently, to convey goods, and deliver
them at a place appointed, for hire as a business." 2 KENT COM. *599.
32Mr. Adler takes the view that "common" meant "business," but contends
that the law of callings applied to all businesses without reference to monopolistic conditions, originally. But it is to be noted that the number is comparatively few up to the year 14oo; not more than has already been mentioned. He
makes his largest list of businesses in the year sixteen hundred and following.
As shown above, the law of public callings originated between 13oo and 1400
because of the monopolistic and oppressive conditions of business and trade at
the time of the Black Death. Hence the conditions and number in business two
hundred years later has no relation to conditions in 1400 or prior thereto. See
28 HARv. L. Rxv. 149.
333 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 15 at 385-6.
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serve, and not the duty to use care, in such times, was the distinguishing feature of the public interest of the trade or business.
Those upon whom the duty to serve is placed may vary with
economic conljtions, but not those upqn whom the duty to use
cre is placp.11
What were e ecenomic copdjtions, then, which, in the Fourteepth Century brought most, if not all, businesses within a class
which had plae4 upon them by law, without special agreement,
the d11ty to serve all who applied? An investigation of the trade
conditiops betwee n 1300 and the rise of the action of assumpsit
will throw muc light op the subjec.
The first case we have op record, qf those ina common calling, is th ,fth f Fyma of 1348." In that §a=e year the
B1ack Dea* brpke 9p in IFpgapd and swept the eptire country.
The death rate was estimate4 frorm nine-tenths to onpe-fifth of the
pojdlswQth places it at one-half of the
entire populatiqn.i 0'
ppplation
jI
a rers and tradesmpn of all Iinds found themselyes ina pqsjtqp to exact apy price jtjey pleased. The StatUteS of Lahourers were passed to deal with this situation;38 the
firsf in 1349. The pripciples found throughout all of these statutes were: all must work who are able; at a reasonable rate; and
none could refuse to practise his calling to whomever applied.
In 1363 it was enacted that handicraftsmen should pursue one
trade only.3 9 This was to prevent them from changing from
"The writer is quite unable to agree with Professor Burdick's statement

when he says, "But in fact it seems to me that the position of one who is

engaged in a common calling and refuses to serve an applicant is quite distinguishable from the carpenter who promises to build a house and does not do so.
The former has in fact entered upon the undertaking of a common calling while
the carpenter has entered upon no undertaking, and when the former refuses to
serve he is not really refusing to enter upon an undertaking as the carpenter
is bup is refusing to perform the public undertaking already entered upon."
1iCo. L. REv. at 517, 518 (191). It is submitted, that if the carpenter is a
common carpenter (one who makes such his trade) he holds out to the public

to as great an extent as any other business now classed under the phrase "public
calling."
-"Y.B. 22 Ass. 94, pl. 41 (1348).
3032

COL. UNIV. STUD. IN HisT. EcoN. AND PuB. LAW I (1908).

2 HoLDSWORTH 460.

(1349) 23 Ed. 1In; (1351) 25 Ed. In; (1357) 31 Ed. in st. I,c. 6; (1359)
33 Ed. nr c. 9-11; (1363) 37 Ed. IIIC. 5-14; (1368) 42 Ed. iiic. 6; (1378) 2
Rich. Irc. 8; (383) 7 Rich. ri c. 5; (1388) 12 Rich. II c. 3-5, 7, 9, 13.
(1363) 37 Ed. m c. 6.
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one trade to another, where the restrictions were not so burdensome. In 1388, because of the shortage of agricultural laborers,
it was enacted that those who served until the age of twelve
should not be apprenticed to any other trade. Statutes were
directed against forestalling, regrating, conspiracies to raise prices,
guild ordinances to secure monopolies of trade, etc. 40 Statutes
were passed regulating the price and penalizing a refusal to serve
42
in all trades. 41 All problems they sought to solve by legislation.
The fact that there was so much criminal legislation at this time
probably accounts for the fact that there were very few civil
cases on the subject, especially for refusal to serve, while indict43
ments for excessive prices were very common.
'* (I436)

15 H. vi c. 6.

(I357) 31 Ed. iI c. io; Fishermen, (1361) 35 Ed. II c. I;
Tailors, etc., (454) 33 H. vI c. 5; Chandlers, (1432) 1i H. Vi c. 12; Shoemakers, (1464) 4 Ed. IV. c. 7.
' Holdsworth says, "We do not find, it is true, general statements that
certain specific acts, such as combinations to raise wages or otherwise to restrict
trade are wrongful (at common law), 'But the clearer a thing is,' it was once
said by James, L. J., 'the more difficult it is to find any express authority or
any dictum exactly to the poin? ([1875] io Ch. App. 526) and to the medimval
mind the view that the law could punish any departure from the ordinary conditions and modes of trading would have seemed self-evident. (Erle, Trade
Unions 5-11, 25.) . . . We have seen that a judge in Henry V's reign seemed
to think that to make a contract in restraint of trade was almost a crime.
(Y. B. 2 H. I, Pasch, pl. 26 (1414)) and whether a departure from the ordinary
modes and conditions of trading should be treated as a crime or tort, the medieval lawyer or legislator would probably not have stopped to enquire." 2
HoLDSWORTH 470.
One such King's Bench indictment reads:
"Indictment for excessive prices charged by Craftsmen.
"Further they (the jurors) say that dyers, drapers and tanners are
dwelling in the town of Ware, where they were not wont to be, but within
the borough of Hertford, to the grave damage of the Lord the King, and
the Lady Queen Isabel, Lady of the same town of Hertford aforesaid, and
against the liberty of the aforesaid Queen, and that the same dyers and
tanners use their craft in too excessive wise, to wit, the aforesaid dyers take
for a cloth sometimes half a mark, sometimes 4o0d. and sometimes more,
where they were wont to take for a cloth 6d. only, and the aforesaid tanners buy oxhides and divers other hides at a low price and refuse to sell
them unless they gain on the sale fourfold, to the greatest oppression and
damage of the whole people." K. B. ANCIENT INDICTMENTs (1354) 38,
m. 22d, reprinted in BLAND, BROWN & TAWNEY, ENG. Ecox. HIsT. SELECT
Doc. 169.
4Victuallers,

A writ to enforce Payment of Excess of Wages to the Collectors of a
Subsidy:
"We command you to compel all and singular artificers, servants
and
workmen, as well as women, of whatsoever condition they be, convicted or
hereafter to be convicted before you of such excessive salaries, liveries,
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Economic conditions of the time, as manifested by contemporaneous legal records, show the monopolistic state of trades
and businesses and staterments of students and writers seem to be
unapjrpous upon this point.4 4 Edward ITT was exceedingly enterprjsipg in iscommerciaj policy s shQwfn by the statutes of the
day. l4onopoly wfts and special franchises were the only rules
of business, and regulation of prices by statute the usual condition. At this tire, also, the craft guilds aided materially in setting up m.Qnopolistic conditions. Trades were limited, craftsmen
were scarce and formed into monopolistic organizations. 45 Wherever mq

po .istj

tepdericjes appeare4, the business, irrespective

of jpd, was limite4 ad regulated to any degree Tiecessary for
the pIlpjc gqP0. T,l§ s
tQ have [bee4 the early test pf a
tees
hires, or stipends, whatsoevl eceiye4 y Ijiem . . as well by imprisonnent of their bodjes as
o
lawfp nIahner . . . to pay to you
witout delay
.W
w.
Aeyve so'r'celved in excess. . . . Witness
the King at We s'ister, x2 Jun,." C3Iq) Close Roll, 24 Ed. II1
p. I,
,.
6d reprinteq ili
BiaND, BRO'N & TAWNlPY, sfprg at "7o ' Fo'r a list
of
Tines assessed, etc., see Exch. K. R. Estreats, 11, 2 (135)'; Subsidy Roll
T07, 41 (1352), reprinted'jg BLA D, BROWN & TAWNEY, supra at 169, 171.
"Abrams says (ENGLISir LIFE AND MANNERS OF THE MiDDLE AGES 81):
"Merchants in turn became exclusive and endeavored to obtain monopolies of
sale of their commodities aid conseqgently it was necessary to check their
agg-essioi by law. ... Fvi4ence of the strp gle against monopolies may'also
be seen i an attempt to obiaii the right to sell herring anywhere in Great
Yarmouth at the time of the herring fair, but its failure as Miss Law points
out was chronicled by the Statute of Herring (1357)."
I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 644: "In London
definite civic legislation [of trade] begins at an early period. In 1189 FitzAlwyne's Assize was issued. It has been well called the earliest English 'Building Act' (Munim. Gildh. pp. xxx. 319) ; it contains some stringent provisions
as to the houses that men may erect A somewhat similar ordinance was issued
in 1212 after a great fire, and it did not scruple to fix the rate of wages for
masons, carpenters, tilers and the like (Munim. Gildh. ii., 86). Thenceforward
ambitious attempts were made to regulate the price of commodities and the

business of various crafts."

SALZMATJN, HENRY II, 225: "With the growth of trade other unauthorized
gilds sprang up, and in 118o nd fewer than nineteen such 'adulterine' gilds were
reported in London alone."
52 HoLDswoRTH 463, "That wages and prices
should be fixed by free competition, they would have thought a monstrous absurdity. Can we in the twentieth century who live in an atmosphere of free competition tempered by strikes,
lockouts, and rings, say, as decisively as economists of the middle nineteenth
century, that the views held by the legislature in the fourteenth century were
unreasonable? That its views on these matters were in fact reasonable, both
for the fourteenth century and long after, can be seen from the fact that both
the status of the labourer as defined by these statutes and decisions, and many
of the other provisions of these statutes were adopted by framers of the statute
of 1562-1563 (5 Eliz. c. 4) which fixed the main principles of the law of
employer and workman for more than a century and a half."
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calling.46

The duty to serve was the essence of the
regulations of the time.
The case of 1450 is possibly the earliest case for refusal to
serve. 47 In that case it was agreed by the court:
"that where a smith declines to shoe my horse, or an innkeeper refuses to give me entertainment at his inn, I shall
have an action on the case, notwithstanding no act is done;
for it does not sound in covenant. . . . Note, that in this
case a man shall have no action against innkeeper, but shall
make complaint to the ruler, by 5 Ed. IV 2, contra, 14 H.
VII 22."

This note seems to indicate that there was some confusion
as to where the liability arose, whether by common law or by
statute. There seems to have been a liability at common law with48
out a statute, for we have also the court saying about this time
that if a smith refuses to shoe my horse or if he pricks him, an
action on the case lies against him. Not many such cases were
likely to arise during the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, because the duty to serve all was so fully covered by criminal statutes of the times. It is more likely the plaintiff would
prefer to pay whatever price was asked in order to get the
service, because of the monopoly arising from immediate needs,
and then have the person indicted, as records show was a common
49
practice.
In 1518 in The Doctor and the Student it is said: 50
"The conclusions presented here it seems accord with those of Professor
Wyman, although we traveled along different lines in reaching them. He says,
"Those in a public calling have always been under the extraordinary duty to
serve all comers, while those in private business may always refuse to sell if
they please. So great a distinction as this constitutes a difference in kind of
legal control rather than merely one of degree. The causes of this division
are, of course, rather economic than strictly legal; and the relative importance
of these two classes at any given time, therefore, depends ultimately upon the
industrial conditions which prevail at that period. Thus in the England which
we see through the medium of our earliest law reports the mediaval system of
established monopolies called for legal requirements of indiscriminate service
from those engaged in almost all employments. There followed in succeeding
centuries an expansion of trade which gradually did away with the necessity for
coercive law." I WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS (1911) 2.
Keilw. 50, pl. 4 (1450).
"Keilw. 5o; Roll. Abr. 91; Saund. 312.
Supra notes 41, 42, 43.
W Supra note 4.
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"And if he would percase refuse to carry it unless
promise were made unto him that he shall not be charged
for no misdemeanor that should be itq him, the promise were
void; for it were against reasorp.'
!twas alsp said: 51
"If an innkeeper refuses a guest on pretense that his
hpuse is f14l1 of guests, if this be false, action on the case

lies."

1.4t then it ws stated :52
"An aptin4 cantipt be maintained against a carpenter
sirply as such apd withpt any express consideration for an
;apy snstainied i cgpqselpnce of his not entering upon a
piece of wplk ,ybjirh he had engaged to perform." 53
Very early we see ttat the duty to serve on request became
inyived in he dlevelnpment of ast~npsit and actions fpr Jreach
of parol pronises. Yet the refuso, tO hp!d
4
carpenter in this
case and the succeeding ones may,be explained on two grounds.
First, that this might not have been a "common" carpenter, the
view taken by Sir William Jopes. 54 Second, economic conditions had changed sufficiently to warrant a change in those upon
whom the duty to serve was placed. This, I believe, is the true
explanation of the case. If such a case had occurred one hundred years earlier, at the time when such duty was imposed upon
all callings, the carpenter's case would unquestionably have been
placed in line with the smith, the tailor, the surgeon, etc.
At the time when the carpenter's case came -up, the law of
assumpsit was stated by Newton (1436) :51
"Ifa carpenter makes a covenant with me to make a
house good and strong and of certain form and he makes
me a house which is weak and bad and of another form, I
shall have an action of trespass on my case. So if a smith
"I Roll Abr. 3.
" I Bacon Abr. *93.
"Citing Elsee v. Gatward, 5 T. R. 143 (i793), and see Y. B. 2 H. iv, f. 3,
pl. 9 (i4oo); ii H. iv, f. 33, pl. 6o (14o9).
"JONE.S, BAILMENTS 100.
"Y. B. 14 H. vi, f. i8, pl. 58 (i436).
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makes a covenant with me to shoe my horse well and properly, and he shoes him and lames him, It shall have a good
action. So if a doctor takes upon himself to cure me of
my disease and he gives me medicine, but does not cure
me, I shall have an action on my case. So if a man makes
a covenant with me to plough my land in seasonable time
and he ploughs in a time which is not seasonable I shall
have my action on my case. And the cause is in all these
cases that there is an undertaking, and a matter in fact beyond the matter which sound merely in covenant."
It is to be noted that the cases of the smith and surgeon
were included with the carpenter. There can be no doubt about
the liability of all such trades in the earlier law, but times were
changing and we begin to see some doubts arising as to the liability for refusal to serve.
In the same year (1436) that Newton made the statement
above, we see still some expressions of the earlier law coming
up. Paston and Juyn, JJ., say: 56
"It is said that if a carpenter takes upon himself to
make me a house and he does not do so, I shall have no
action upon my case: Sir, I say that I shall. And sir, if in
your hostelry a smith makes a covenant (promise?) with
me to shoe my horse, and he does not do so, and I move on,
and my horse has no shoes, and is injured for want of shoes,
I shall have my action on my case. And if you who are Serjeant at law take upon yourself to plead my plea and do not
do it or do it in another manner to that which I have directed so that I lose, I shall have an action on my case . . ."
Juyn, J.: "Agreed, and as Paston has said if the smith does
not shoe my horse I shall have an action just as much as
if he shod him and lamed him; for all that is dependent upon
the agreement and merely accessory to it; and as I have an
action upon that which is accessory, I shall have an action
on the principal." Paston: "that is well said." 57
The law as thus understood was stated for the last time.
"Ibid.
"Professor Burdick offers quite an ingenious explanation of the cases:
"But in fact it seems to me that the position of one who is engaged in a common
calling and refuses to serve an applicant is quite distinguishable from that of
the carpenter who promises to build a house and does not do so. The former
has in fact entered upon a general undertaking of a common calling, while the
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Business and economic conditions were changing in England.
Trade and commerce were increasing. Three or four generations had passed since the Black Death. Valid reasons existed
for not extending the duty to serve and for dropping many businesses already in this class, such as the smith, surgeon, or carpenter.
The case of the carpenter can also be explained on the ground
that he was not a "common" carpenter. On this, Sir William
Jones says: 5
"In regard to the distinction before mentioned between the nonfeasdhce and the misfeasance of a workman,
it is indispitably clear, that an action lies in both cases for
di reparation in dahages, whenever the work was undertakefi for a reward, either actually paid, expressly stipulated,
or, in the case of aicommon ti-ader, strongly implied; of
which Blackstohe ives the following instance: 'If a builder
promises, undertakes or assimes to Caius that he will build
and cover his house within a tiie limited, and fails to do
it, Caius has an action on the case against the builder for
his breach of his express promise, and shall recover a pecuniary satisfaction for the injury sustained by such delay.'
The learned author meant, I presume, a common builder -or
supposed a consideration to be given; and for this reason I
forbore to cite his doctrine as in point as the subject of an
action for non-performance of a mandatory." 59
But this distinction not being drawn in the case, the economic theory, which deals with fundamentals, seems the better
explanation.
If what has been said here is true, the same reason exists
today for the law of public callings in the cases in which it applies (and probably others) as in those cases of earlier days.
What has been said, the writer thinks, bears out Professor Wyman's forecast, a few years ago, of the probability that the law
carpenter has entered upon no undertaking, and when the former refuses to
serve he is not really refusing to enter upon an undertaking as a carpenter is,
but is refusing to perform the public undertaking already entered upon." ii
COL..L. REV. 5r4 at 518 (191). It is difficult for the writer to conceive of any
public undertaking in those days in the case of the tailor, smith, victualler, and
not in the case of the carpenter. Shelter is as important to man as shoes for his
horse, food or clothing. Also see note 33 supra for other comments upon this
view.
Supra note 54.
Italics are the writer's.
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of public callings may be invoked in cases of the monopolistic
trust problems of modem times. 60 Those in the class have
changed and will continue to change with altered economic conditions, but the reason still exists for the class, call it monopoly,
possibility of oppression, economic advantage, public emergency
or what not.
The following conclusions may be drawn from what has been
said:
i. The duty to use care applied to all trades and callings in
the first instances.
2. The only distinction made in the imposition of this duty
was between those engaged in a trade or calling as a common
practice, and those who did the same acts by special agreement
occasionally. In the latter case no remedy existed in early law
for any injurious consequences resulting from the transaction.
3. The duty to serve has its origin at an entirely different
time (i. e., Black Death) from that of the duty to use care.
4. The duty to serve, it seems, was placed upon all trades
and callings during the time of the Black Death. This may account for the confusion of the word "common" with "public."
5. The cases reveal a confusion at the time as to whether
there was also a common law liability for refusal to serve besides that imposed by penal statutes.
6. The duty to serve was the first distinguishing characteristic of the class of businesses known today as "public callings."
7. The classification was made, not upon some inherent characteristicof the business itself, but upon a factor outside the business which varied as times changed, as the carpenter cases reveal.
8. This factor was economic conditions, which determined
those upon whom the duty to serve was placed, or in other words,
the importance of the business to the public.
Norman F. Arterburn.
Washburn College Law School,
Topeka, Kansas.
4017 HARv. L. REv. 156 (1904).

